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COMMENTS
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
AS A PRACTICAL SYSTEM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN MOTOR VEHICLES
DONALD H. BOND
The position of a person taking security interests in motor vehicles
in Washington is plagued with uncertainties. A sharp increase in the
rate of defaults on loans so secured could make that position not only
uncertain, but precarious. This unsatisfactory state of affairs is caused
by the obsolescence of the present system for providing constructive
notice of such security interests. A comparison of that system, which
consists of the Washington certificate of ownership statute and the
conditional sales and chattel mortgage filing statutes, with the recently-
drafted Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft
Act' makes this fact painfully obvious. However, such a comparison
should be undertaken, not solely to criticize the existing law, but to
determine what should be done to improve that law.
In 1937, with the enactment of what is now the certificate of owner-
ship chapter of the motor vehicle laws of Washington our statute law
in this area was cast in its present form.' The certificate of owner-
ship chapter provides a system whereby all non-statutory liens on
motor vehicles within the scope of its operation could be made a
matter of public record. All persons who operate such vehicles must
have effective certificates of ownership for those vehicles and comply
with the other provisions of the certificate of ownership chapter.'
Encumbrances other than statutory liens must be declared in applica-
tions for certificates of ownership.4 Where such an encumbrance is
declared, a certificate of ownership will be issued to the lienholder of
the vehicle.' This certificate must contain the name and address of
1 Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
approved and recommended for enactment in all the states by the Commissioners at
their annual conference, August, 1955. This statute was approved by the American Bar
Association August, 1955. It is anticipated that the National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances soon will also approve this act with some formal changes
to conform it to the style of the UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE.
2 RCW Chapter 46.12.
3 RCW 46.12.010. RCW 46.16.010 provides that persons operating any vehicle on
public highways of the state must have certificates of license registration in force for
those vehicles. RCW 46.16.030 exempts vehicles of certain nonresidents from this
requirement. RCW 46.16.020 exempts state and publicly owned vehicles.
4 RCW 46.12.030(2).
5 RCW 46.12.050.
19561 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF SECURITY INTERESTS 373
the lienholder as well as that of the party who is entitled to possession
of the vehicle and who holds it subject to the encumbrance.' When a
vehicle for which a certificate of title is already in effect is mortgaged,
the mortgagor must apply for a new certificate of ownership which will
be issued to the mortgagee, and which will list the name and address
of the mortgagee and mortgagor on its face.' Upon transfer of a
vehicle, the transferee, unless he is a dealer,' is required to apply for
a new certificate of ownership within fifteen days after delivery to
him of the vehicle. This application must be accompanied by the old
certificate of ownership, endorsed by the former owner and the lien-
holder, if any.' A procedure is provided by which certificates of own-
ership are cleared of the names of lienholders whose interests have
been satisfied."°
A certificate of ownership law could be enacted as the exclusive
means for providing constructive notice of security interests in motor
vehicles, thereby replacing the chattel mortgage and conditional sales
filing statutes. No such intent is expressed in the Washington statute.
However, in Merchant's Rating & Adjusting Co. v. Skaug," it was
held that a mortgagee who had properly filed his security agreement
under the chattel mortgage filing statute, but who had failed to comply
with the certificate of ownership statute, could not prevail over a sub-
sequent mortgagee or a subsequent purchaser who had relied on the
certificate of ownership. The court did not indicate whether compliance
with the certificate of ownership statute would protect the mortgagee
in absence of compliance with the chattel mortgage filing statute.
Subsequently, the court held that a lienholder who had not filed was
6 RCW 46.12.050. It should be noted that in RCW Chapter 46.12 the chattel mort-
gagee or conditional sales vendor is not referred to as the "lienholder," nor is the chattel
mortgagor or conditional sales vendee always referred to as the "owner." Instead the
party in posssesion subject to encumbrances is referred to as the "registered owner,"
RCW 46.04.060, or "owner," RCW 46.04.380. Where there is no encumbrance he is
referred to as the "legal owner," RCW 46.04.270, but where there is an encumbrance
the lienholder is referred to as the "legal owner," RCW 46.04.270.
7RCW 46.12.170.
8 When a transferee is a dealer he is not required to apply for a new certificate of
ownership, but may retain the certificate of ownership he received upon the transfer to
him, which certificate he must, in turn, deliver to his transferee. RCW 46.12.120.9 RCW 46.12.100-110.
1o RCW 46.12.170 provides a procedure by which the certificate of ownership is to
be surrendered by the lienholder and a new certificate of ownership delivered to the
owner on satisfaction of the secured debt.
11 4 Wn2d 46, 102 P.2d 227 (1940) (the theory of the court was that as between
innocent parties the one who made the fraud possible by leaving the mortgagor in pos-
session of the certificate of ownership should bear the loss); Comment, 15 Wash.L.Rev.
182, (1940). A contrary result has been reached as to a judgment creditor. Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Hambright, 16 Wn.2d 81, 133 P.2d 278 (1943) ; cf. Junkin v. Anderson,
12 Wn.2d 58, 120 P.2d 548, 123 P.2d 759 (1941).
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not protected against a subsequent good faith purchaser of an interest
in a motor vehicle although the lienholder had possession of the cer-
tificate of title."
Thus, compliance with the filing statutes does not protect one against
subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers who are found to have
relied on the certificate of ownership. At best, a lienholder in such a
situation faces litigation on the question of whether there has been
such reliance if he is to preserve his preferred status. On the other
hand, the lender is unable to rely on the certificate of ownership in
place of filing because the certificate of ownership apparently does
not give protection beyond actual notice of the security interest.
Consequently, today's lender holding security interests in vehicles
under Washington law is forced either to gamble with his security by
not filing his chattel mortgage or conditional sales contract, 3 or to
follow the cumbersome procedure of complying with both the certifi-
cate of ownership and the chattel mortgage or conditional sales filing
statutes. The latter practice is wasteful and burdensome because the
filing statutes not only duplicate the procedure followed under the
certificate of ownership statute, but they also serve a purpose which
could be better served by certificates of ownership.
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act
provisions are in many ways similar to those of the present Washing-
ton certificate of ownership law. They require that all persons
tificates of title for those vehicles."' The names and addresses of exist-
ing lienholders in the order of their priority and the date of their secur-
ity agreements must be shown on applications for first certificates of
title.' Where, after original issuance of a certificate of title, a
security interest is created, the owner must indicate the name and
address of the lienholder and the date of the security agreement
on the certificate and deliver it to the lienholder who is to forward it
to the department (presumably of licenses)." Each certificate of
title issued must contain the above information as it is indicated on
12 Cf. General Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 Wn.2d 185, 111 P.2d 762 (1941)
(holding for the defendant who took an interest in an automobile without obtaining the
certificate of title, the court stating, "It is not unusual for a certificate of title to be
lost or mislaid, and James did get the papers necessary to secure a duplicate.").
13 This is apparently what some lenders have done, applying the filing fees thus saved
to a reserve fund to cover possible losses due to non-filing.
14 UNIFORIA MOTOR VEHIcLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT AcT § 4(a).
15 Id. § 6(a) (3),(b).
1Id. § 21(a),(b). Cf. Id. § 9(c). This procedure is to be followed where a security
interest is created at the time of transfer as well as where the owner creates a security
interest in a vehicle without transferring possession of the vehicle. Id. § 14(d).
[WIN TER
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the application or old certificate of title.17 When there are one or
more lienholders named on a certificate of title, the certificate is to
be issued to the first lienholder."8 When the security interests indi-
cated on the certificate have been satisfied the certificate is to be
cleared as provided in the act. 9
These provisions are supplemented by a number of other provisions
unlike those of the Washington statute. The draftsmen of the Uniform
Act have been careful to provide a procedure for transfer of a vehicle,"0
or creation of another security interest therein,2' where a lienholder
is in possession of the certificate of title at the inception of the trans-
action. They have also provided for maintenance of a central record
of all certificates of title, recording them under the title number
assigned the vehicle, the manufacturer's or other identifying number
of the vehicle, and alphabetically, under the name of the owner.2" The
Uniform Act also differs from our present statute in that it provides
for constructive notice of junior security interests.2
Perhaps the most fundamental difference between the Uniform
Act and the Washington certificate of ownership statute is to be found
in Section 25 of the former which provides:
The method provided in this act of perfecting and giving notice of
security interests subject to this act is exclusive. Security interests
subject to this act are hereby exempted from the provisions of law
which otherwise require or relate to the filing of instruments creating
or evidencing security interests.
If this section were enacted in Washington, persons undertaking trans-
actions within the scope of the certificate of title act would no longer
have to resort to the cumbersome and inadequate chattel mortgage
and conditional sales filing statutes to insulate their security interests.
Transactions so favored under the Uniform Act are those in which
security interests are "reserved or created by agreement and which
secure payment or performance of an obligation,"2 4 and in which the
17Id. § 9(a) (3).18 Id. § 10. "The certificate of title shall be mailed to the first lienholder named in
it or, if none, to the owner." The act also contains specific provisions to this effect
where the security interest has been created or reserved on transfer, Id. § 14(d), has
been otherwise created by the owner, Id. § 21(d), as well as where a prior security has
been satisfied, Id. § 23(a), and upon original issuance of a certificate of title. Id. §
18(a).19)Id. § 23(a),(b).201d. § 14(c).
21 1d. § 2 1 (c).
22 1d. § 8(b).
2 See RCW 46.12.150 and RCW 46.12.170 which apparently allow for existence of
only one security interest at a given time.
4 UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT Acr § I(k).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
security is in a vehicle for which a certificate of title is required."
Certain statutory liens and security interests created by manufacturers
or dealers holding vehicles for sale are expressly excepted from
the act.26
One of the more beneficial effects of enactment of Section 25 would
be the elimination of the vexing problem caused by the difference in
requirements for filing between the conditional sales and the chattel
mortgage statutes." Under present law, failure to conform filing to
the form in which the transaction was drafted, for example, filing what
is found to be a chattel mortgage as a conditional sale contract, results
in no effective filing."
The class of persons protected by the constructive notice provisions
of the Uniform Act is indicated in Section 20(a) which provides:
Unless excepted by Section 3, a security interest in a vehicle of a
type for which a certificate of title is required is not valid against cred-
itors of the owner or subsequent transferees or lienholders of the vehicle
unless perfected as provided in this act.
The identity of the class of persons protected by this section is the
same whether their security agreements are in the form of chattel
mortgages or conditional sales. This may be contrasted with our
present filing statutes under which the identity of the class protected
varies with the form of the security agreement.29 Section 20(a) seem-
ingly does not limit protection to "subsequent transferees or lien-
251d. § 20(a).
26 Id. § 3(a) (liens given by statute or rule of law to suppliers of services or materials
for the vehicle), Id. § 3(b) (liens given by statute to the United States, this state or any
political subdivision of this state), Id. § 3(c) "A security interest in a vehicle created
by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the vehicle for sale (, but a buyer in the ordi-
nary course of trade from the manufacturer or dealer takes free of the security inter
est)." The bracketed portion of § 3(c) is of particular interest in light of that line of
Washington cases which have held against a lender who has complied with the filing
requirements, but has left a motor vehicle with a dealer who subsequently sells or
encumbers it to a bona fide purchaser who claims adversely to the lender. See Shattuck,
Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 WAsH.L.REv. 227 n.137,(1954) where these cases are collected. The adoption of the well-recognized "purchaser
in the ordinary course" concept might bring some certainty to this area where the case
holdings have been notable for their inconsistency.
27 RCW 61.04.020 (chattel mortgages); RCW 63.12.010 (conditional sales).25Veblen v. Foss, 32 Wn.2d 385, 201 P.2d 719 (1949); Hughbanks, Inc. v. Gourley,
12 Wn.2d 44, 120 P2d 523 (1941).29 RCW 61.04.020 (chattel mortgages-protects all existing and subsequent creditors
of the mortgagor whether or not they have a lien on the property and against all subse-
quent purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees and encumbrancers for value and in good
faith); RCW 63.12.010 (conditional sales-makes an unfiled conditional sale absolute
as to subsequent creditors of the vendee whether or not they have a lien on the prop-
erty and as to all bona fide purchasers, pledgees, mortgagees and encumbrancers). See
RCW 61.04.020 (chattel mortgage removal statute-property removed from the county
in which it was filed is "except between the parties thereto and those having actual
notice thereof, exempted from the operation" of the mortgage).
[WINTER
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holders" who take in good faith and for value. If this were the opera-
tion of this section it would be substantially different from our present
law." However, it appears that such was not the intent of the drafts-
men of the Uniform Act who seem to have patterned Section 20(a)
after a section of the California Vehicle Code which has been con-
strued to offer no protection to purchasers or encumbrancers with
actual knowledge.?° The absence of qualification of the term "cred-
itor" in the section quoted raises similar questions about that pro-
tected class: whether protection is limited to lien creditors,3 and
whether existing as well as subsequent creditors are intended to be
protected?32
The procedure for perfecting 23 a security interest is set out in Sec-
tion 20(b) which provides:
A security interest is perfected by the delivery to the Department of
the existing certificate of title, if any, an application for a certificate
of title containing the name and address of the lienholder and the date
of his security agreement and the required fee. It is perfected as of the
time of its creation if the delivery is completed within ten (10) days
thereafter, otherwise, as of the time of the delivery.
Unlike existing law, this section does not require the filing of the
security agreement, duly executed with statutory formalities.3 The
Uniform Act does, however, place a duty on the lienholder to disclose
certain information, beyond that contained on the certificate, to the
owner of the vehicle and other lienholders3 4
Delivery of the old certificate of title and application to the depart-
ment as required by Section 20(b) accomplishes state-wide perfection
of a security interest in the vehicle which is the subject of these docu-
ments. This state-wide perfection would do much to eliminate a
-o See note 29, supra.
3oa See 7 CAL.JuR2d, Automobiles § 432(1953) citing DEERING'S CALIFORNIA CODES,
VEHICLE CODE § 196; Bush v. Bank of America, 1 Cal.App2d 588, 37 P.2d 168 (1934).
:1 Both RCW 61.04.020 and RCW 63.12.010 expressly provide for the protection of
creditors whether or not they have a lien. The absence of such a qualification could be
taken to indicate an intention that creditors without liens were not intended to be pro-
tected. See RCW 65.08.040 (bill of sale statute). In most states only lien creditors are
protected. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDoTIONAL SALES §§ 245, 247b (Bowers
ed. 1933) ; cf. 7 CAL.JuP.2d, Automobiles § 432 (1953).32 RCW 63.12.010 (conditional sales-protecting only subsequent creditors).
32a "A security interest is 'perfected' when it is valid against third parties generally,
subject only to specific statutory exceptions." UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT ACT § l(k).
33 RCW 61.04.020, 040 (chattel mortgages); RCW 63.12.010 (conditional sales).
"4 See UNIFoRm MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT AcT § 24,
"A lienholder named in a certificate of title shall, upon written request of the owner or
of another lienholder named on the certificate, disclose any pertinent information as to
his security agreement and the indebtedness secured by it."
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problem which is most difficult with a chattel as mobile as the motor
vehicle under a filing system like our own: that of determining with
whom to file originally and how to keep that filing effective until the
security interest has been satisfied. At present, the proper place for
filing is determined by the form of security used.3" Chattel mortgages
must be filed with the county auditor in the county "in which the
mortgaged property is situated."" This language, in one case, was
held to mean the place where the purchaser lived, where the vehicle
was delivered, and where it was recited in the mortgage that the
vehicle would be kept, although the car was sold in a different county.'
Conditional sales contracts, on the other hand, must be filed with the
county auditor in the county in which the vendee resides at the time
he takes possession of the property."8 This does not always result
in the conditional sales contract being filed in the county in which
the property is kept. This is the case, for example, where a corporate
vendee has the property in a county other than the one in which his
principal place of business is located.39
Since Section 20(b) contemplates state-wide constructive notice,
its enactment would eliminate the necessity of refiling where a
mortgaged vehicle is removed into a county different from that in
which filing has been accomplished. Under present law, if a vehicle
subject to a chattel mortgage is removed to another county, the
mortgagee must refile in the county to which the vehicle has been
removed or with the Secretary of State within thirty days after the
removal. If he fails to do either his interest is susceptible of being
cut off by intervening parties without actual notice of his interest."
While this removal statute adequately protects the interests of those
who need to check the files for possible encumbrances, it places a
burden on mortgagees who must either exercise very close supervision
over their security or file with the Secretary of State in addition to
filing at the outset with the county auditor.41
Conversely, under our present conditional sales filing statute, con-
ditional sales vendors already enjoy the advantages of state wide
constructive notice upon accomplishing original filing with the county
auditor. It is those who must check the files for a possible vendor's
85 RCW 61.04.020 (chattel mortgages); RCW 63.12.010 (conditional sales).
368 RCW 61.04.020.
37 Muller v. Bardshar, 119 Wash. 252, 205 Pac. 845 (1922).
38 RCW 63.12.010.
39 Bucknor-Weatherby Co. v. Wuest, 167 Wash. 647, 9 P2d 1104 (1932) ; First Nat.
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interest in a vehicle no longer situated in the county of original filing
who would benefit from enactment of Section 20(b) 42
Like our present filing statutes, Section 20(b) provides a ten day
"free period" in which filing may be accomplished with a retroactive
effect. This section, however, should be compared with the language
of our present filing statutes as to the point in time when the "free
period" begins. The chattel mortgage statute provides that this period
begins with the execution of the mortgage.4 3  The conditional sales
44statute provides that it begins when the vendee takes possession.
However, the cases construing these two Washington filing statutes
are unclear" and appear to offer no guide for determining when the
"time of... creation" of a security interest within the meaning of
Section 20(b) would be. This matter would have to be determined
as a matter of substantive law should such a provision be enacted.
Unlike our present filing statutes, Section 20(b) allows security
interests not perfected within the ten day period to be perfected
thereafter as of the time that the old certificate of title, application
for a new certificate and fee are delivered to the department. This is
in sharp contrast with the needlessly harsh provisions of the existing
Washington filing statutes which make failure to file within the ten
day period an absolute bar to later filing. 8 In such cases the only
hope of the lienholder under the filing statutes is to obtain the cooper-
ation of the other party in executing a new chattel mortgage of the
vehicle. 7
42 It may be extremely difficult to determine in which county filing was accomplished
even if it is known in which county delivery was made. See note 39, supra.
43 RCW 61.04.020.
" RCW 63.12.010.
45 Under the chattel mortgage statute the date of execution has been held to be the
date of signing and acknowledgement, Greenberg v. Manganese Prod., Inc., 39 Wn2d
794, 238 P.2d 1194 (1951); the date of acknowledgement, Myers-Shepley Co. v. Mil-
waukee G.E. Co., 124 Wash. 583, 214 Pac. 1051 (1923); and the date of delivery of
the mortgage, Fenby v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 127, 101 Pac. 492 (1909). The latter case has
been distinguished in the Greenberg case as being based on an earlier statute, but
would seem to be a proper holding as to the date of "creation" of the security interest.
The Greenberg case has been strongly criticized. Shattuck, Secured Transactions
Undcr the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 WAsH.L.RPv. 203 n.75 (1954). Our court has
held that, under the conditional sales statute, the date the vendee takes possession for
purposes of determining when the ten day period begins, is the delivery date recited in
the contract despite actual delivery at a different time. Malott v. General Mach. Co., 19
Wn.2d 62, 141 P.2d 146 (1943); Grunbaum Bros. Furn. Co. v. Humphrey Inv. Corp.,
141 Wash. 329, 251, Pac. 567 (1926) ; contra, In re Kracke, 1 F.2d 606 (W.D. Wash.
1924). See Shattuck, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 29
NVAsif.L.REv. 203 n.75a (1954).
46 Clark v. Kilian, 116 Wash. 532, 199 Pac. 721 (1921) (chattel mortgage); Worley
v. Metropolitan Motor Car Co., 72 Wash. 243, 130 Pac. 107 (1913).
47 See Robinson, Thieme & Morris v. Whittier, 112 Wash. 6, 191 Pac. 763 (1920);
Cf. Allen v. American Loan & Trust Co., 79 Fed. 695 (9th Cir. 1897).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
The Uniform Act contains no provision that the certificate of title
shall cease to give constructive notice without some sort of renewal
procedure after a given length of time. Apparently, once it is per-
fected, a security interest will remain insulated indefinitely. This is
also the case under the present Washington conditional sales filing
statute. By contrast, filing under the chattel mortgage statute must
be renewed within two years after the maturity date of the mortgage. 8
Failure to renew subordinates the mortgagee to purchasers and encum-
brancers without notice who take after the maturity date of the
mortgage." The operation of this renewal statute as to creditors is
not altogether clear,"0 but persons acquiring the status of creditors
two years or more after the maturity date of the mortgage will be
prior to the mortgagee in absence of timely renewal.5 Since renewal
is valid for only one year, filing must be extended by filing additional
affidavits to preserve it for subsequent years. 2 How our chattel
mortgage renewal statute operates where the maturity date is not
indicated on the mortgage is unknown.
The Uniform Act, in Section 23(a), provides a procedure for
clearing certificates of title after a security interest indicated thereon
has been satisfied:
Upon the satisfaction of a security interest in a vehicle for which the
certificate of title is in the possession of the lienholder, he shall, within
ten (10) days after demand and, in any event, within thirty (30) days,
execute a release of his security interest, in the space provided therefor
on the certificate or as the Department prescribes, and mail or deliver
the certificate and release to the next lienholder named therein, or, if
none, to the owner or any person who delivers to the lienholder an
authorization from the owner to receive the certificate. The owner,
other than a dealer holding the vehicle for resale, shall promptly cause
the certificate and release to be mailed or delivered to the Depart-
ment, which shall release the lienholder's rights on the certificate or
issue a new certificate.
Section 23(b) provides a similar procedure for release of a junior
security interest where the certificate of title is in the possession of a
prior lienholder. The sanction for refusal to comply with the above
procedure is a $500.00 fine, six months imprisonment or both." The
48 RCW 61.04.040
49 Best v. Felger, 77 Wash. 115, 137 Pac. 334 (1913).
50 See Cardwell v. Ruckert, 187 Wash. 92, 59 P.2d 1120 (1936).
5 1 Strong v. Sunset Copper Co., 9 Wn.2d 214, 114 P,2d 526 (1941).52 RCW 61.04.050.
5 3 Uxn'omt MOToR VEHaICLE CFaRTilCATE oF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT ACT § 40(b).
This is the penalty for wilfully failing to deliver a certificate of title to the department
or violating other provisions of the act not constituting a felony. Id. §§ 31(b) (2),(4).
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present Washington certificate of ownership 4 and filing statutes"
provide for clearing the records when a security interest is satisfied,
but the sanction for failure to indicate the satisfaction of a filed chattel
mortgage or conditional sale contract is much less severe than under
the Uniform Act: a $25.00 fine. 5
Secondary financing has not escaped the attention of the draftsmen
of the Uniform Act, who, in Section 22, provide for assignment of his
interest by the lienholder:
(a) A lienholder may assign, absolutely or otherwise, his security
interest in the vehicle to a person other than the owner without affect-
ing the interest of the owner or the validity of the security interest, but
any person without notice of the assignment is protected in dealing
with the lienholder as the holder of the security interest and the lien-
holder remains liable for any obligations as lienholder until the assignee
is named as lienholder on the certificate.
(b) The assignee may, but need not to perfect the assignment, have
the certificate of title endorsed or issued with the assignee named as
lienholder, upon delivering to the Department the certificate and an
assignment by the lienholder named in the certificate in the form the
Department prescribes.
Section 22(b), in effect, provides that an assignment of a security
interest in a vehicle is valid against third parties generally, subject to
the statutory exception contained in Section 22 (a) protecting "persons
without notice of the assignment... dealing with the lienholder as
the holder of the security interest.. ." until the assignee is named as
lienholder on the certificate of title. 7 The quoted language of Sec-
tion 22 (a) seems unclear. It appears that "persons... dealing with
the lienholder" could include, 1) subsequent assignees of the assignor
and transferees of the vehicle who obtain a satisfaction of the security
interest from the assignor, 2) attaching or executing creditors,* and
3) obligors, that is, the mortgagors and conditional sales vendees.
The inclusion of obligors seems most unlikely as obligors are gener-
ally protected, as a matter of contract law, in dealing with assignors
until they receive actual notice of assignment, and therefore would




F See note 32a, supra.
* Subsequent to the writing of this article, information has been received from the
draftsmen of the Uniform Act that it was not their intent to include attaching or
execuing creditors within the class of persons "dealing with" the lienholder under
Section 22(a).
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by the fact that if obligors were within the class of "persons" dealing
with the lienholder" under Section 22(a) they would be divested of
part of the protection which they have traditionally enjoyed under
the common law because they would be precluded from safely dealing
with their assignors after constructive rather than actual notice of
assignment.
Section 22 would clearly change present Washington law. It would
require compliance with its procedure for giving constructive notice
of assignment of a conditional sale contract before such transactions
would be insulated against the parties protected by Section 22(a),
whereas assignments of conditional sales contracts are now expressly
exempted from any filing requirements. 8 Less change would be
effected in the present law governing assignments of chattel mortgages,
it being assumed that the protection afforded by Section 22(a) is
limited to subsequent assignees of the assignor and transferees of the
vehicle obtaining satisfaction from the assignor. Although the perti-
nent statute now in effect is merely permissive in wording," it has
been applied so as to require filing of an assignment of a chattel
mortgage to insulate the assignee's interest against a subsequent bona
fide purchaser for value claiming acknowledgement of satisfaction
of the mortgage by a mortgagee-assignor." It also seems likely that
this statute requires such filing for protection against subsequent
assignees of the assignor of a chattel mortgage.6
In Section 20(c) the Uniform Act resolves some of the problems
of the validity and perfection of security interests in conflicts of law
which are presently unresolved. That section provides:
If a'vehicle is subject to a security interest when brought into this
state, the validity of the security interest is determined by the law of
the jurisdiction where the vehicle was when the security interest
attached, subject to the following:
(1) If the parties understood at the time the security interest
attached that the vehicle would be kept in this state and it was brought
into this state within thirty (30) days thereafter for purposes other
than transportation through this state, the validity of the security
interest in this state is determined by the law of this state.
58 RCW 63.12.030.
59 RCW 61.16.010.
60 Gottstein v. Harrington, 25 Wash. 508, 65 Pac. 753 (1901).
61 See Price v. Northern Bond & Mortgage Co., 161 Wash. 690, 297 Pac. 786 (1931)
(real estate mortgage); General Credit Corp. v. Lee James, Inc., 8 Wn.2d 185, 11
P.2d 762 (1941) (a complex transaction involving an unfiled assignment of a chattel
mortgage considered by the court whose holding suggests that the principle of the
Price case applies equally to chattel mortgages, although the status of the party who
took, apparently relying on absence of any filed assignments, is unclear.)
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(2) If the security interest was perfected under the law of the juris-
diction where the vehicle was when the security interest attached, the
following rules apply:
(A) If the name of the lienholder is shown on an existing certifi-
cate of title issued by that jurisdiction, his security interest continues
perfected in this state.
(B) If the name of the lienholder is not shown on an existing
certificate of title issued by that jurisdiction, the security interest
continues perfected in this state for four months after a first cer-
tificate of title of the vehicle is issued in this state, and also, there-
after if, within the four (4) month period, it is perfected in this
state. The security interest may also be perfected in this state after
the expiration of the four (4) month period; in that case perfection
dates from the time of perfection in this state.
(3) If the security interest was not perfected under the law of the
jurisdiction where the vehicle was when the security interest attached,
it may be perfected in this state; in that case, perfection dates from the
time of perfection in this state.
(4) A security interest may be perfected under paragraph (2) (B)
or paragraph (3) of this Sub-section either as provided in Sub-section
(b) or by the lienholder delivering to the Department a notice of
security interest in the form the Department prescribes and the
required fee.
The general rule, as set out in the preceding section, is in accord with
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws which provides that the validity
of chattel mortgages is to be tested by the law of the situs of the
property at the time of execution of the mortgage,62 and the validity
of conditional sales contracts is to be tested by the law of the situs
of the property at the time of sale. 3 This also appears to be the law
in Washington as to conditional sales,6" and, although no holdings in
point have been found, the expectable result as to chattel mortgages.
Where a chattel mortgage or conditional sale of a motor vehicle is
validly made under the laws of another state and the vehicle is there-
after removed to Washington without the consent of the lienholder
the general rule of Section 20(c) would apply and the security agree-
ment would be valid in Washington. This is in accord with present
62RESTATEirNT, CoFiLicr oF LAWS § 265(1934); See 10 Au.jun., Chattel Mort-
gages § 19 (1937); 11 Am.Ju ., Conflict of Law § 74 (1937).63 RESTATEMENT, Co1FLIcr OF LAWs § 272 (1934); see 11 AU.JUR., Conflict of Law
§ 77 (1937).
64 See Morton Organ Co. v. Armour, 173 Wash. 462, 23 P2d 887 (1933) (without
comment the court applied the law of the state of delivery, i.e., Washington, in determin-
ing whether the agreement, which contained a recital that it was executed under and
governed by the law of California, was valid as a conditional sale); cf. RESTATEmENT,
COiNFLIcr OF LAW § 272, comment c. (1934).
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Washington case law governing conditional sales, 5 and with the expect-
able result where a chattel mortgage is involved.68
Section 20(c) (1) codifies the concept that if the parties to the
security agreement contemplate immediate removal of the property
security to another state, the validity of the security agreement is to
be tested by the law of the state to which a removal has been made.
The principle, one not foreign to Washington law, has been applied to
determine the validity of a conditional sale." A result consistent with
that principle also has been reached in determining the validity of a
chattel mortgage.68 The Uniform Act, however, would restrict the
concept by limiting its application to situations where there is not only
consent to the removal of a vehicle by its lienholder, but also, 1) an
understanding at the time of the security agreement that such removal
would be made,6" and 2) an actual removal into the state within thirty
days thereafter before validity of the security agreement will be deter-
mined by Washington law. This section also makes it clear that it
would not apply to removals of a transitory character.
In Section 20(c) (2) provision is made for perfecting a security
interest which has been previously perfected in another state. Section
20(c)(2) (A) allows for "automatic" perfection of security interests
shown on certificates of title from other states. In such cases perfec-
tion results from the operation of certain other sections of the Uniform
Act which provide that current certificates must accompany applica-
65 Campbell v. Frets, 167 Wash. 576, 9 P.2d 1083 (1932); Roedecker v. Jannah, 125
Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364 (1923) (a conditional sales contract valid under California
law, but which could not be validly created under Washington internal law because it
gave the vendor the cumulative remedies of repossession and a right against the vendee
for any deficiency, was held enforceable in Washington against an innocent purchaser
where the vehicle had been removed to Washington without the consent of the vendor);
see RESTATE-MENT, CONFLICT OF LAW §§ 273,275 (1934).
66 Roedecker v. Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364 (1923) (dictum); see RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 266 (1934).
67 See Campbell v. Frets, 167 Wash. 576, 9 P.2d 1083 (1932). There the buyer and
seller of an automobile executed a conditional sales contract in North Dakota, the
buyer to take delivery in that state. It was contemplated that the buyer would immedi-
ately take the vehicle into South Dakota, which he did. Some time later the buyer
removed the vehicle to Washington without the consent of the seller. It was held that
the contract was enforceable in Washington, although it gave the seller the cumulative
remedies of repossession and a right against the vendee for any deficiency remaining
after sale of the vehicle, as it was valid under the law of South Dakota. Cf. Sound
Industrial Loan Co. v. Frank Allyn, Inc. 149 Wash. 123, 270 Pac. 295 (1928) ; Weber
Showcase & Fixture Co. v. Waugh, 42 F.2d 515 (W.D.Wash. 1930).
68 Jones v. North Pacific Fish & Oil Co., 42 Wash. 332, 84 Pac. 1122 (1906). But
the rationale of the court went beyond this. It was stated that by consenting to the
removal of the property from F-i, the mortgagee waived his mortgage as to all parties
except the mortgagor.
69 See Sound Industrial Loan Co. v. Frank Allyn, Inc., 149 Wash. 123, 270 Pac. 295(1928) where the court treated knowledge of removal after the fact plus apparent
acquiescence thereafter as equivalent to consent to removal given at the outset.
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tions for new local certificates of title, 0 that any security interests
shown thereon must be reflected on that local certificate,7 and that
the new local certificate must be delivered to the lienholder shown on
the prior certificate. 2
Where security interests that have been perfected in other states
are not shown on an out-of-state certificate of title, a four month
period is given by Section 20(c) (2) (B) during which time the out-
of-state perfection continues and the security interest may be per-
fected locally by complying with Section 20(c) (4) without a lapse
of constructive notice to local creditors and purchasers. During this
period prior owners, lienholders and local purchasers are protected
by a requirement that a bond be filed with the department conditioned
to indemnify them against loss caused by issuance of a local certificate
of title.71 Where such a bond is not filed and a local certificate is
issued, local parties are protected by the distinctive appearance which
must be given the local certificate of title.74 This appearance will put
all those dealing with the certificate on inquiry as to the existence of
undisclosed liens.
The procedure by which all out-of-state security interests, other
than those indicated on a valid certificate of title, may be perfected
is indicated in Section 20(c) (4).
Far different from the above detailed statutory provisions are our
own filing statutes which are not designed to allow perfection of
security interests in vehicles brought in from other states." Except
in the rare cases where it is possible to fie the out of state transaction
within the ten day free period, such perfection seems impossible. Our
court's position has been that where the parties do not intend to
remove chattels from other states at the time of sale our conditional
sales statute is not applicable," but that where such removal was con-
templated and takes place local filing may be mandatory.7 7  In the
former case there is an obvious hardship upon parties who ordinarily
would be protected by our filing statutes, and who have no practical
means of getting adequate constructive notice of interests of record
7 0 UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERT IF CATE OF TITLE AND ANTI-THEFT AcT § 6(c) (1).
71 Id. § 9(a) (3).
72 Id § 10.
7I § Il(b).
74 Id. § 9(b).
7G RCW 61.04.020; RCW 63.12.010.
70 See Campbell Co. v. Frets, 167 Wash. 576, 9 P2d 1083 (1932); Roedecker v.
Jannah, 125 Wash. 137, 215 Pac. 364 (1923).
77 See Sound Industrial Loan Co. v. Frank Allyn, Inc., 149 Wash. 123, 270 Pac. 295
(1928).
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in another state. In the latter case there is an equally obvious hard-
ship on the lienholder. In this area the enactment of Section 20(c)
would be manifestly beneficial.
In conclusion, it should be noted that all the provisions of the
Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act have
not been examined."8 Indeed, the Anti-Theft provisions have been
completely ignored. This is consistent with the purpose of this
comment, which is to point out, by a comparison of the provisions
of the Uniform Act governing constructive notice of security interests
in motor vehicles with the existing law in Washington, in what ways
our local law might be improved. It is not contended that all provi-
sions of the Uniform Act are suitable for enactment in Washington.
It is contended, however, that the system of constructive notice pro-
vided in the Uniform Act is far more adequate than that which we
now have in Washington, and that the best way to improve the present
system is to follow the fundamental plan of the Uniform Motor
Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act. The basic statutory
machinery for use of a certificate of title to give constructive notice
of security interests in motor vehicles already exists in Washington.
Motor vehicle owners would probably find the mechanics of a system
such as that contemplated by the Uniform Act little different from
that with which they have been dealing for almost twenty years. The
change could be made effectively by enactment of legislation making
the present certificate of ownership the exclusive medium for giving
constructive notice of security interests in motor vehicles, and making
such other changes as might be necessary in order to adapt the existing
system to this new function. But a wholly adequate change would also
deal with other related problems, including secondary financing and
conflict of laws. The weaknesses of the present system indicate the
need. The Uniform Act offers a solution. Washington no longer need
be without a practical system for giving constructive notice of security
interests in motor vehicles.
7s There are many other provisions of the UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE AND ANTI-TH=F Act which could be profitably examined. Among them are
those sections providing for transfers to dealers Id. § 15, transfers by operation of law,
Id. § 16, and those sections which apply where the certificate of title has been lost,
stolen or mutilated, Id. § 13 all of which are similar to provisions of our present cer-
tificate of ownership statute. Other sections of interest are those which give the Depart-
ment of Licenses power to revoke or suspend certificates of title, Id. § 26, to prescribe
forms, Id. § 28(a), to conduct investigations, Id. § 28 (b) (1) and to make reasonable
rules and regulations. Id. § 28(b) (2). Also of interest are those sections which entitle
persons aggrieved by acts or omissions of the Department of Licenses under the act to
administrative hearings, Id. § 29, and judicial review thereof. Id. § 30.
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